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Abstract 
The working paper looks at the history of Iranian media by and for women, 
culminating in cyberfeminism. The main focus are women’s websites and cyber 
campaigns dedicated to improving women’s rights, and how they helped to 
mobilize Iranian women’s movements. There are two main case studies: The 
main case study on websites is the “Feminist School” as an important site for 
feminist discourse and women’s movements managed from inside Iran. The 
main case study in relation to cyber campaigns is the “My stealthy freedom” 
campaign which is undertaken from outside Iran. Through these two case 
studies, the paper aims to answer the following questions: To what extent and 
how do these sites provide strategic opportunities for the Iranian women’s 
movement to advocating gender equality and women’s rights? And did the 
cyber campaign help to build coalitions between women’s movements inside 
Iran and diaspora activism outside of Iran? The case studies are based on the 
author’s earlier work on the history of the women’ movement,  interviews with 
leaders and directors of women’s websites and directors of mobilizing cyber 
campaigns along with self-reflective and discourse analysis of the websites and 
campaigns. A biography of the author can be found here: http://www.pen-
deutschland.de/en/themen/writers-in-exile/ehemalige-
stipendiaten/mansoureh-shojaee/ 
Keywords 
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1 Táhirih (Qurratol Ayn) [1817–52] was an Iranian poet who was executed on account of her 
outspokenness and free unveiling. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%A1hirih: 
accessed 5 July 2016. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
This working paper looks at the history of Iranian women’s contribution to journalism and 
media, via an exploration of today’s cyberfeminism that links Iranian feminism and the Iranian 
diaspora. It positions cyberfeminism in relation to the history of the Iranian women’s movement, 
beginning from the first women’s newspaper to the emergence of cyberfeminism in Iran and 
now in the Iranian diaspora. 
  
The working paper describes how the media has shaped and informed the Iranian 
feminist movement, which has struggled to survive the oppressive tactics of various Iranian 
regimes. The first section explores the early journals and magazines of the Iranian feminist 
movements. The second is a study of women’s websites and cyber campaigns on women’s rights. 
And the third is a discussion on social media and cyberfeminism in Iran and in the diaspora. 
 
The paper is based on the author’s original research, activism and analysis. The first 
section is based on her research into early feminist journals from 1994 onward. The second is 
based on her personal engagement in feminist activism and websites – in particular those of the 
Feminist School, of which she is a founder and editorial-board member. The third forms her 
analysis and reflection on the role of cyber campaigns in mobilizing (or not) Iranian women’s 
movements. 
  
The next section gives a detailed history of the many different forms of media produced 
by feminists in Iran over the last 100 years. This is followed by a discussion on the emergence of 
cyberfeminism. The fourth section then provides two in-depth case studies which illustrate how 
the Internet was harnessed by feminists in and outside Iran. The first case study deals with the 
Feminist School website with which the author is deeply engaged. The Feminist School1 was 
established in 2008 with the setting up of its website edited by Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani.2 
This became an important site for feminist discourse and women’s movements, managed inside 
Iran but also linked to writers (including the author) working in the feminist diaspora. The 
second case study is based on the author’s analysis of the well-known international 
cyber campaign ‘My Stealthy Freedom’.3 On 3 May 2014, this movement set up a Facebook 
page, managed outside Iran by Iranian journalist Masih Alinejad, and publishes photos of women 
living in Iran but without wearing a hijab – even if only for a minute.  Finally, the conclusion will 
reflect on the role of ‘clicktivism’ in contemporary cyberfeminism. 
  
The working paper explores the following questions: 
 
 What is the history of cyberfeminism in Iran? 
 How do current cyberfeminism sites provide opportunities for the Iranian women’s 
movement? 
 How does cyberspace support the women’s movement’s goals in advocating gender 
equality and women’s rights? 
 How do cyber campaigns outside Iran work with the women’s movement in Iran? 
 Do these campaigns build a bridge between women’s movements inside Iran and 
diaspora activism outside Iran? 
 
                                                     
1 http://feministschool.com/: accessed 2 April 2016. 
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noushin_Ahmadi_Khorasani: accessed 22 April 2016. 
3 http://mystealthyfreedom.net/en/about: accessed 2 April 2016.   
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The research is based on original material on the history of the women’ movement, interviews 
with leaders and directors of women’s websites and directors of cyber campaigns, and self-
reflective analysis of the Feminist School website and the Stealthy Freedom cyber campaign. The 
paper was originally written in Persian, and then translated and edited with the support of the 
ISS Civic Innovation Research Initiative. 
 
 
2. A SHORT HISTORY OF IRANIAN WOMEN’S POLITICAL AND CIVIC 
STRUGGLES  
2.1. Early Beginnings 
 
Persian history began six centuries before the birth of Christ, when the Achaemenid Empire 
came to power. It was followed by a succession of dynasties lasting until the end of the Pahlavi 
dynasty in 1979. This was replaced by the Islamic republic of Iran. The ancient, pre-Islamic 
dynasties ruled the area before AD 651 (the end of the reign of Yazdegerd III, last king of the 
Sassanian Empire). Greek historians such as Plutarch wrote about the situation of women in 
Persia before the rise of Islam, stating that they enjoyed the some legal and social freedoms as 
men (Sheykh ul Islami,1972: 63). ‘The main religion of Iranians was Zoroastrianism. Their sacred 
book the Avesta, names six deities, of which half are women. In this period both genders are seen 
as equal. Iranian women are involved in social matters, and participate in martial matters. In the 
Sassanid dynasty, two Iranian princesses Pourandokht, and Azarmidokht for a short time ruled 
the country’ (Sanjana, 1982: 25–6). 
 
Iran was attacked several times by tribal groups and the rival empires of Rome, Greece, 
Turkey, Arabia and Mongolia. The conflict between Rome and Iran lasted from 92 BC to AD 
631, and the Arab attack on Persia took place in AD 651. All of these empires influenced the 
situation of women in Iranian society. The greatest impact was felt during the 200 years that Iran 
was under Arabian rule, which led to the spread of Islam throughout the country from AD 651 
until 884. In the mid-nineteenth century, more modern thinking and systematic protest by 
Iranian intellectuals emerged against the ruling Ghajar dynasty. This dynasty ruled Iran for over a 
century (1795–1925) and was criticized by intellectuals both male and female – for their 
corruption and repression (Kasravi,1940: 25–9). 
 
Many scholars consider the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–7 a turning point 
in the history of modern Iran, which ushered in a century of popular struggles and resistance 
against the absolutism of the shahs and Western imperialism. One of the most well-regarded 
Iranian publications, the Encyclopedia Iranica,4 based at New York’s Columbia University, has the 
main role of documenting the intellectual background of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 
This movement of intellectuals led to the revolution that demanded a constitutional monarchy 
and the establishment of a parliament and voting rights. 
 
At the time even the text of the Constitution itself did not have universal support. Yet, in 
spite of ideological ambiguities, the Revolution remains an epoch-making episode in the 
modern history of Persia because of its political achievements and its enduring social and 
cultural consequences. As a modern revolution, it was aimed at dislodging the old order 
by means of popular action and by advocacy of the tenets of liberalism, secularism, and 
nationalism. For the first time in the course of modern Persian history, the 
                                                     
4 http://www.iranicaonline.org/: accessed 5 July 2016. 
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revolutionaries sought to replace arbitrary power with law, representative government, 
and social justice and to resist the encroachment of imperial powers with conscious 
nationalism, popular activism, and economic independence. Constitutionalists also tried 
to curb the power of the conservative religious establishment through modern education 
and judicial reforms. By centralizing the state, they sought to reduce the power of the 
tribal and urban notables. The greater sense of nationhood that emerged out of the 
Revolution has remained essential to the modern Persian identity.5 
 
During the Constitutional Revolution, women participated in struggles engaging in 
underground activities against foreign forces, boycotting of foreign goods and raising funds for 
the establishment of the National Bank (Sanasarian, 2005: 40). 
 
However, in 1906, when the nationalist movement succeeded in establishing a 
constitution demanding the ‘equality of all citizens in law’, women were not recognized in the 
deﬁnition of ‘citizen’. The emergence of the women’s movement in Iran goes back to this time, 
when women demanded the right to free association, education and freedom of the press. 
  
The ‘Iranian women’s movement’ was thus started by women concerned with liberal 
democracy and changes to the constitution. It was a sub-movement of the overall intellectual 
drive that demanded liberty and equality within the constitutional movement, the primary 
demands of which were: 
 
a) Access to education 
b) Establishment of societies and independent publishing  
c) Political and social participation 
 
At the beginning of 1907, following the victory of the constitutional activists and the 
establishment of parliament, a modern constitution was founded. It was inspired by Iranian 
culture and included regulations adopted from France, the Netherlands and Belgium. The 
country’s Islamic clergy was able to amend the constitution to include some Islam-inspired rules, 
including the disenfranchisement of women. Female constitutional activists who had worked 
against the dictatorship were, along with male activists, prevented from voting by this new 
constitution, and were treated as being on a par with children, the physically disabled and the 
mentally ill. 
 
Women activists responded with a groundswell of objection against this discrimination, 
which they saw as a systemic denial of their rights. Progressive women engaged in a set of 
political and civil efforts to form a new independent movement, which knew what women 
wanted and demanded. 
 
The voice of this sub-movement to the public movement against dictatorship was 
expressed in specialized journals for women, in the establishment of women-only organizations 
and in the founding of girls’ schools. 
  
                                                     
5 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i: accessed 16 April 2016. 
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2.2. From Constitutional Movement to Islamic Revolution 
 
The Iranian women’s movement has, from its inception up to the present day, given priority to 
two major elements: independent organizations for women and the production of a distinct 
women’s media. 
 
The aforementioned media is a powerful tool, which has had a very profound role in 
increasing the voice of women and stating their demands. Women’s engagement in the media 
has varied throughout the different eras of modern Iranian history, but their continuing demands 
to be represented keeps the movement alive. When government pressure reduces, the volume of 
women’s media (e.g. periodicals and newspapers) increases significantly. 
 
Research and investigation into the media in general, and the publication of newspapers 
in particular, shows that the role of, and the language used by, the press – especially the women’s 
press – has been influenced by political power and civil society (Shamsolvaezin, 2010). General 
uprisings, such as the activities involved in pushing for a constitutional monarchy, and other 
historical turning points – e.g. the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil company, the Islamic 
Revolution, President Mohammad Khatami’s Reform Government, and the Green Movement – 
all led to major changes in media practice and content, including in the women’s press. 
 
In this chapter, I explore the impact of political power and civil society on women’s 
publications in the modern, contemporary period. 
 
2.3. Women Speaking with a ‘Woman’s Tongue’ 
 
The first Iranian women’s journal, Danesh, was published in 1911. It was a medical periodical 
published by a group of women activists and intellectuals. The editor was a female doctor: Dr 
Kahal.6 This weekly journal was devoted to family, child-rearing and health issues. In the first 
volume, the editorial set out the publication’s main focus: ‘this magazine is for the discussion of 
family issues, teaching housekeeping, feminine wifely duties, and child bearing…it won’t talk 
about the politics of the country’. This magazine discussed the concerns of middle-class women 
and did not demand any type of reform. There is an occasional reference to women who became 
pregnant out of wedlock, abandoned babies, disrespectful attitudes towards women in the streets 
and the way that middle-class women were treated in marriage, i.e. like a maid. 
 
Two years later, in 1913, another journal was published, by Maryam Amid 
Mozayenossaltaneh, entitled Shokoufeh (Blossom – see picture 2). Its focus was on the 
familiarization of women with literature, teaching child-rearing and housekeeping, encouraging 
literacy/education, combatting superstitious beliefs about women and the promotion of ethical 
standards. Over the following years, the magazine openly criticized child marriage and eventually 
became a more political publication that targeted international audiences and became affiliated 
with an association for the education of women. 
 
                                                     
6 Bagheri, Elaheh (2014) The attention to hygiene and health in the first women’s magazine in Iran, 
http://www.feministschool.com/spip.php?article7300: accessed 22nd April 2016. 
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Picture 2: Cover of Shokoufeh journal. Source: 
http://mehrkhane.com/fa/news/12357/%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C
%D9%86-
%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB
%8C-
%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%8
6%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-
%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86 (accessed on 6 October 2016) 
 
 
Another magazine, entitled Women’s tongue, was published in 1920 in Isfahan. It 
courageously published articles on women’s issues. It was the first official women’s journal to 
carry a licence bearing the name of a woman, Sedigheh Dolatabadi,7 who was the magazine’s 
publisher. From the beginning, she took on the struggle for women’s rights. Dolatabadi criticized 
the hijab in the magazine, and received death threats. She wrote uncensored editorials against the 
influence of Britain in Iran, which led to the magazine being closed down for 13 months. 
                                                     
7 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dawlatabadi-seddiqa: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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Dolatabadi lived to be 80 (1882–1961): in her will, she requested that women wearing the hijab 
should not be allowed to take part in her funeral or to visit her grave (Sanasarian: 59). In 1980, a 
year and a half after the Islamic Revolution, her gravestone was defiled  under the  edict  of 
Mohamad Sadeghi Khalkhali, an extreme clergyman and jurist of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Court. 
 
This incident illustrates the hatred and vengeful nature of the government of that time 
against feminism and its promoters. Despite violent incidents such as these, the name and 
memory of Sedigheh Dolatabadi has become a unifying force in the women’s movement. She is 
so valued and respected that even 41 years after her death, the first professional non-
governmental women’s library was established in her name in 2003 in Tehran.8 This library was a 
section of the Women’s Cultural Centre,9 a female-staffed non-governmental organization 
(NGO) of which the current author was a founder, board member and library director. The 
library’s founders thus included board member of the cultural centre and some honorary 
founders such as Simin Behbahani (1927–2014), a prominent Iranian contemporary poet, lyricist 
and activist. A book prize was established in her name for the best published book in the field of 
women’s studies. The library was shut down by security forces in 2012 after many threats; 
however, the book prize continues to be awarded despite similar threats. Its news and 
announcements are released via the Internet. 
 
In 1921, the Nameh Banovan (Ladies’ Letter) was published by the editor Shahnaz Azad. It 
boldly talked about the hijab as a barrier to women’s progression. The tone and articles 
published in the magazine didn’t appeal to Iran’s ruler at the time – Reza Shah Pahlavi – so it 
was barred from publication after three days. The motto of this magazine was written boldly on 
the cover: ‘The awakening and salvation of helpless, long-suffering women’.10 
 
Iran’s neighbour, the then USSR, also had some impact on the country’s intellectuals – 
especially in the north of Iran. The promises of the Bolshevik Government to improve the 
situation of women situation encouraged leftist women in the north of Iran – specifically in 
Rasht, a city near the border with, Russia – to establish a new group called Jamiat e Peyk e Saadat 
Nesvan (Messenger of Happiness for Women). This Rasht women’s organization, founded in 
1928, which published a magazine with the same title as the group, was the first organization in 
Iran to celebrate International Women’s Day on 8 March that year. The founders of the 
magazine and organization were arrested and imprisoned in the early years of Reza Shah’s rule 
(Sadr-Hashemi, 1953: 1–5). 
 
As this brief history illustrates, the impact of political power and civil society on the 
Iranian women’s press was very important. The first 15 years after the constitution, with all its 
attendant ups and downs, was drafted (1905–1920) saw a distribution of political power and the 
generation of a civil society in Iran. The following 20 years were marked by the opposite: namely, 
the centralizing of political power and the weakening of civil society. This shift can be noted in 
the quality and quantity of publications in these two different eras. 
 
When Reza Shah attained power in 1925, he established a modern era, ignoring the country’s 
Islamic clergy. But he prevented the required cultural change, especially on women’s issues. His 
                                                     
8 http://sedighedolatabadi.org/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
http://www.jadidonline.com/story/18052009/dr/dowlatabadi: accessed 25 April 2016. 
9 Emami, Goli (2005) Against All Odds: The Story of a Woman’s Cultural Center in Iran, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Goli%20Emami%20Presentation%20for%20Web%20Revised.p
df: accessed 17 April 2016. 
10 http://www.qajarwomen.org/fa/collections/903.html: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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era gave an illusionary appearance of progress for the changes that occurred under his rule 
produced barriers to the advancement of the women’s movement. Some women’s organizations 
were censored and replaced by government-overseen institutions. Censorship grew, and 
progressive journals, including independent political magazines, were shut down. In 1942, most 
of the country’s women’s journals were published by women’s societies, on topics ranging from 
housekeeping to objecting to the situation of women, and some also talked about national 
independence as well. 
 
A review of the journals of that time shows that government pressure barred women 
from public participation. The aforementioned publications were the ‘lever’ to bring them into 
the social fabric, by establishing organizations and enabling them to start publishing for 
themselves. 
 
Several critical external events ran contemporaneously to these developments in Iran – 
the First World War, the occupation of Iran and the growth in Bolshevik power in Iran’s 
neighbourhood among them. There was also the influence of the women’s rights movements in 
Britain and the United States. These events inspired women in Iran to push for internal changes. 
Equally, the influence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s modernization reforms in Turkey on the Shah 
of Iran, and the anti-colonization movement of Egyptians rising up against Britain (including the 
numbers of Egyptian women joining this resistance and the Feminist Union of Egypt) all had a 
positive impact on the women’s movement in Iran.11 
 
2.4. Thirty Years and Three Incidents: 1942–1972 
 
The second Pahlavi regime, 1942 
 
The Second World War, and the exile of Reza Shah Pahlavi from the country, caused political 
chaos. Even though Iran was occupied by the Allies, the succeeding Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza 
Shah, brought better conditions, introducing freedom of speech, assembly and association. 
Although no women’s societies were formed in this period, they regained the independence of 
20 years previously, as most of these organizations were affiliated to a political party, or a special-
interest group. 
 
One of the most radical women’s groups at this time was Tashkilat-e-zanan Iran (Iranian 
Women’s Party Organization), a branch of the Toudeh party of Iran. This organization 
published a journal, entitled Our Awakening, in 1945. The journal spoke about the need to end the 
exploitation of working women in factories, the establishment of nurseries for mothers and equal 
pay for equal work. 
 
Another organization that was active at this time, entitled Anjoman-e-Zanan (‘Women’s 
Association’), had a newspaper called Zan-e-emruz (Today’s Woman), which was published in 
1944. By 1945, it was barred from publishing – as were other democratic papers. Nevertheless, in 
the late 1940s there were still some journals and newspapers being published by this women’s 
                                                     
11 Badran, Margot (2008) Egyptian feminism in the nationalist era, translated by Faranak Farid, 2016, 
www.bizfeministler.org/%D9%81%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D9%85-
%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%B1-
%D9%85%D9%80%D9%84%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-
%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%A8/: accessed on 24th April. 
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association. These publications highlighted the discriminatory policies of the government. They 
were dependent for sponsorship upon their own political parties, and even from non-feminist 
groups – which brings into question their independence. In fact, it can be observed that the 
focus of the national government was on the nationalization of the oil industry, which became a 
priority over other public issues, and women’s journals experienced problems with circulation 
during this time. 
 
The CIA coup d’etat, 1953 
 
After the coup d’etat in 1953 by the Iranian Army and the CIA (US Central Intelligence Agency), 
Iran’s national government collapsed. Mohammad Reza Shah governed once again, all media 
were placed under severe restrictions, and there was a revocation of the right of assembly and 
the freedom to form societies. The only newspapers that had permission to publish were those 
that defended the actions of the government, which included those journals published by women 
affiliated with the government. Such an inequitable and elitist viewpoint was the major barrier 
preventing the integration of women of all classes into political society. Thus, whatever was seen 
as the women’s movement in that period was primarily the expression of women affiliated with 
the government, and the women’s journals reflected the policies of the regime. 
 
The White Revolution reform, the women’s franchise and the right to vote, 1963 
 
In January 1963, the Shah of Iran held a national referendum to obtain approval for his entire 
governance programme, which was known as the White Revolution, or the ‘Revolution of the 
Shah and the People’. Women were given the right to vote in 1963 as part of the reforms. In 
reality, the struggle for women’s right to vote, and the right to political participation had begun 
50 years earlier – and anti-government feminist women did not welcome these reforms, believing 
they were hypocritical as they were imposed by a dictatorship. They publicly denounced the new 
reforms as governmental propaganda from elitist women’s groups. 
Following the White Revolution, women’s activities depended on the government. There 
was a lack of progressive movements, and very few from the grass roots. Reforms remained 
under the control of the government, and even if women’s activities in different fields were 
recognized as legal and official there was no autonomous women’s movement. 
 
This lack of women’s autonomous movement was reflected in the reduced presence of 
women in the media. Between the White Revolution and Islamic Revolution, only a couple of 
women’s journals were published – Ettelaat e banovan (The Ladies’ Information – see picture 3 
below) and Zan-e-Rooz (Woman of Today). Ettelaat e banovan was part of the official newspaper of 
the government, called Ettelaat, and it established an organization called Anjoman e Doushizegan & 
Banovan (Ladies’ and Girls’ Assembly) with the aim of discussing women’s rights, political 
participation and family law. The content of the magazine was focused on practical knowledge 
for women’s daily life, and the rest comprised literature, stories and occasional household 
advertisements. Readers of this magazine came from different social groups, and were usually 
registered members of the association. 
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Picture 3: Cover of Ettelaat e banovan magazine. Source: 
https://yazarpozar.wordpress.com/2013/09/03/%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-
%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%87-
%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-
%D9%82%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%85/, accessed on 6 October 2016. 
 
 
According to Lagha Dehdashti (1937–2008), an active member of this association (see 
picture 1 above): ‘Members of this association included women with very high level 
governmental jobs as well as housewives, but it was mostly reflecting the higher echelons being 
from governmental positions. The diversity of the members was also reflected in their dress as it 
included women wearing the headscarf as well as modern and elegantly dressed women.’  She 
also pointed out that ‘the main goals for this diverse group of women were the same: Women’s 
empowerment through education, job position and economic independence.’12 The content of 
the magazine focused on these three topics. 
 
The other magazine, Zan-e-Rooz, was a sub-section of Keyhan newspaper with a high 
circulation. It featured popular news about actresses, cinema, television and very tabloid-style 
love stories. It was the instigator of the ‘Miss Iran’ beauty competition, and was much objected 
to by the clergy of the time. One of the Shah’s most outspoken opponents was a member of the 
clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini, who publicly accused the ruler of ‘violating his oath to defend Islam 
and the Constitution’. Assuming a leadership role for the first time, Khomeini was adept at 
focusing attention on concerns that resonated with the general public (Tohidi, 1994: 115). 
 
                                                     
12 Personal communication in 2005. 
10 
 
The year 1972 saw the start of guerrilla warfare, the rise of leftist groups, and the ‘Muslim 
Fighter’ (a religio-socialist organization). Both men and women joined this struggle against the 
dictatorship. Most of the intellectual, independent women activists curtailed their activities 
focused on women’s rights in order to join in this movement; this suspension continued for 
seven years, until the victory of the Islamic Republic in 1979. 
 
2.5. ‘The Beautiful, Yet Cruel Revolution’ in 1979 
 
A world must be overturned, but every tear that flows is an accusation; and every man 
rushing to do something important who treads even on a worm through pure 
carelessness is committing a crime.13 
 
A revolution usually begins with a great deal of idealism; however, it often results in very 
different outcomes than those imagined. In the Iranian Revolution, for example, women’s rights 
was the first ideological victim of the suppressive revolutionary arm. Approximately one week 
after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the office of Ayatollah Khomeini announced the 
forced wearing of the hijab for women, the abolishment of modern family law and the 
legalization of polygamy. 
 
Shortly after he issued these proclamations, thousands of women marched in protest, 
going out on to the streets on International Women’s Day (8 March) of 1979. The only result 
was to postpone the enforcement of the proclamation by six months (Ahmadi Khorasani, 2013:  
183–4). 
 
The suppression was continued by so called ‘revolutionary’ groups against the 
progressive front, who were termed ‘anti-revolutionary’. Day after day the latter were attacked, 
and any small sign of resistance was repressed by the sharp sword of the Islamic Revolution. 
This era coincided with the Iran–Iraq war, which was the most violent and terrifying time since 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
 
Two aspects aided the suppression: governmental censorship, which consisted of 
‘guillotining’ publications and newspapers. There were no equal-rights activists opposing the 
closing down of one of the two remaining non-feminist, commercial women’s magazines (left 
over from the White Revolution). The magazine Ettelaat e Banovan (Ladies’ Information) 
occasionally spoke of women’s-rights issues, and was barred from publication at the beginning of 
1980. In fact, from 1980 to 1990, the only magazine for women accepted by the government was 
Zan-e-Rooz (Woman of Today). 
 
This magazine tried to persuade hezbollahi (revolutionary) women to confront anti-
revolutionary, ‘bad hijab’ women by suggesting that it was legal to oppose them. In addition, the 
same hezbollahi women during the war promoted the participation in the war effort, and urged 
other women to encourage their husbands and sons to go to the front lines. It also published 
photos of actresses wearing the accepted form of the hijab, who were supported by the 
government. These actresses were from TV series broadcast on Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB), an anti-feminist organization that expected women to adhere to strict, 
oppressive standards of dress and behaviour. 
 
                                                     
13 Rosa Luxemburg (1918) https://rosaluxemburgblog.wordpress.com/quotes-about-rosa-luxemburg/: accessed 25 
April 2016. 
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2.6. Official Women’s Publications 
 
After the end of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini 
in 1988, a new government, entitled the ‘government of development’, was formed. The change 
in administration and leadership, along with the necessity of having international communication 
and international development programmes, led to the government caring more about women’s 
issues. 
 
In reality, the government had noted that women’s issues were one of the factors that were 
promoted by international development programmes. As a result, the extensive censorship of 
newspapers was lessened slightly, so that in 1991, the first monthly periodical with a female 
journalist as editor, Majalleh Zanan (The Women’s Magazine – see picture 4 below), was accepted 
by the government. It published for around 16 years until in 2008, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
came to power and, once more, this magazine was barred from publishing for five years. In 
2013, as a result of another new government coming to power, this magazine once more re-
entered circulation. During these difficult years of censorship and harassment, feminism was 
even considered by some to be a criminal activity. In this oppressive atmosphere, the editorial 
team of Majalleh Zanan claimed that they were the only feminist magazine in Iran at this time. 
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Picture 4: Cover of Majalleh Zanan. Source: 
http://iranianuk.com/20140204223005035/%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-
%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-
%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%BE%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B2-
%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8 (accessed on 6 October 2016) 
 
 
There were, however, other magazines on women’s issues. In 1992, another seasonal 
periodical, entitled Farzaneh (Sage), which specialized in women’s rights, was established. This 
magazine belonged to Islamic feminists with close ties to the government. Other magazines 
appeared, which were mostly governmental or belonged to women with close ties to the 
government, such as Payam e Zan (Woman’s Message), Soroush Banovan (Ladies’ Angel) and Payam 
e Hajar (Hajar’s Message). Although the women who taught Humanities in universities could 
never usually publish any academic periodical specialized in women’s issues, as that would have 
threatened their jobs, there was a periodical called Motaleaat e zanan (Women’s Studies), which 
circulated within academic circles. Iran Dokht was a women’s magazine published by religious 
intellectuals in 2006, which was censored in 2009. Another example of a woman’s newspaper, 
Rooznameh Zan (literally: ‘Woman’s Newspaper’), was published for a year under the reformist 
government, which came to power after the development government, by Faezeh Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, an MP in the sixth parliament who was also the daughter of the development 
government’s president. This newspaper covered the various viewpoints of feminists in Iran, and 
was barred from publishing in the last year of the reformist government. 
 
2.7. Alternative Women’s Magazines 
 
There were also alternative publications by secular feminists, which were subjected to severe 
governmental control and limits but which adopted creative, tactical ways to publish. For 
example, Jense Dovom (Second Sex) and Fasle Zanan (Women’s Season) were two seasonal 
periodical publications that were published by Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, a reputable Iranian 
feminist who obtained permission to publish a book (rather than a periodical) and then used this 
permission to produce a selection of articles. Jense Dovom was published between 1997 and 2000, 
and Fasle Zanan from 2002 until 2004. 
  
The other strategy applied by the Women’s Cultural Centre and some other associations, 
with incredible difficulty and effort, was to publish some reports and feminist opinions in the 
shape of an internal bulletin, which, based upon Iranian law, does not require any permit to 
issue. Considering the fact that they were only allowed to distribute and sell the bulletin in their 
own societies and NGO centres, this type of publication could not reach a wide audience. 
Therefore, some progressive booksellers started to help out NGOs by secretly selling these 
bulletins to their trusted customers ‘under the table’. In this way, some of the alternative 
publications could distribute to a wider audience, even occasionally to small rural towns via 
networking. 
 
Thus, women’s periodicals were spread hand to hand between interested parties in the 
three fields of journalism, activism and academia, avoiding censorship in both official and 
unofficial areas. The response to the spread and development of the women’s movement, 
especially secular feminism, was an increase in control by governmental censors, specifically 
aimed at these publications and these feminist groups. In response, many of these scrutinized 
groups found the need to expand their publications on the Internet. 
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3. CYBERSPACE: ENSURING THE CONTINUITY OF THE WOMEN’S 
MOVEMENT? 
 
At first, many women were not involved in the technological side of the Internet in Iran; they 
were mostly users of these products. From being simply users, however, they soon also became 
producers of material on the Internet.14 Especially in totalitarian countries such as Iran, activist 
women (due to the nature of oppressive governments) have found in cyberspace a way to spread 
feminist dialogues on, for example, how to promote gender equality. 
 
The use of cyberspace became a defensive tactic of the Iranian women’s movement. The 
expansion of the Internet was very much welcomed by female journalists and women’s activists. 
As shown above, they had no opportunity to publish their ideas (especially those promoting 
feminism) within ‘real’ space because of governmental censorship, patriarchal power structures 
and police interrogation. The unconditional freedom of cyberspace allowed activists to write 
freely about women’s issues, adding to the academic voice and making good on earlier 
deficiencies arising from focusing on theory rather than feminist activism. 
 
The ease and direct presence of women’s-movement activists in producing feminist literature in 
the field of cyber-feminism enabled an engagement with feminist theoreticians. Erudite and 
literate younger women, who did not have the opportunity to publish their ideas in public spaces 
prior to Internet accessibility, began to write about feminism in reports, news-research articles 
and creative literature. Their work in internal bulletins reached a wide audience, spreading 
feminist ideas. This new breed of activist-journalist allowed the inter-relations between 
professional journalism and professional activism to develop in the Iranian women’s movement, 
and facilitated the foundation of activist-journalism. 
 
The multiple voices and the continuous presence of women from different groups in cyberspace 
enable a wide spread of feminist ideas. Iranian women’s activists have placed a heavy focus on 
learning and teaching International Communications Technology (ICT) as part of their feminist 
activism and developing the communication potential of this space. Despite government 
censure, the unreliability of Internet technology within Iran and inaccessibility for the large 
majority of women who did not have access to essential computer hardware, cyberspace has 
nevertheless promoted the exchange of information and ideas among independent feminists. 
 
A special characteristic of cyberspace has been to devolve away from a hierarchical 
structure. ‘Being without a head’ means that the Iranian feminist movement is a civil and modern 
movement shaped by diverse groups and individual activists connected via official networks. The 
type of relationships within this movement aims to be horizontal (i.e. on a ‘level playing field’). 
Internet technology allows many women’s movements to develop horizontal relations and a 
                                                     
14 Seifi, Farnaz (2010) Internet, a tool for continuous connections for the Iranian women’s movement, BBC Persian, 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/science/2010/03/100305_superpower_women_internet.shtml: accessed 25 April 
2016. 
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diversity of discourse within the women’s movement. Cyberspace allows activists within the 
women’s field to have their own private media and own voice. 
 
A further characteristic of the Internet is the ease and speed of international 
communications. This speed helped to counter the earlier lack of communication with other 
feminists in different parts of the world, and a debate was opened between international 
women’s movements and Iranian feminists who lived abroad. In fact, the Iranian women’s 
movement took form both inside and outside the country and could be characterized as Iranian 
feminists without borders. Cyberspace allowed a widespread interaction with international 
women’s movements and feminists via the Internet, which could broadcast news of the 
oppression, suppression and discrimination against women in Iran. On the other hand, Iranian 
feminist websites inside and outside the country did not necessarily have the same priorities. 
Through interactive communications in cyberspace, they could support and develop different 
discourses between women’s movements, activists sometimes producing challenging polemics. 
However, despite it being an international, universal forum, there still remain different challenges 
between the varied approaches of the Iranian women’s movements. 
 
Such were the characteristics of cyberspace that laid the foundations of cyber-feminism 
to Iran. Even if the term ‘cyber-feminism’ is based on Western feminism,15 for Iranian activist-
journalists it means something different – using networking made possible via the cyber era to 
achieve their political goals. For some parts of the Iranian women’s movement, this new identity 
was doubly demanding due to the pressure in maintaining a balance between ‘real’ activism and 
publications within cyberspace. For others, cyberspace was a place to find refuge in order to 
organize and redefine their activities in the frame of that same cyberspace. Although cyber-
feminism gave many new facilities to these women, such facilities couldn’t be hidden from the 
scrutiny of security organizations. Feminist websites have been censured and blocked multiple 
times, and many of the activists publishing in cyberspace have been interrogated, imprisoned, 
sentenced to jail and barred from studying or working just because of their writing activities, 
which the security organizations have interpreted as communicating with ‘aliens’. 
 
This increase in pressure on reformist media in the women’s field during the presidency 
of Ahmadinejad between 2005 and 2013 led to the word ‘feminism’ being officially censored in 
sources and works in regards to women.  
 
3.1. Iranian Cyberfeminism: Building on the Shoulders of Women’s 
Websites 
 
During the first two years of the reformist government, independent women’s organizations and 
groups began to have more space to develop their public activities in order to be more visible in 
society. The relative freedom of founding organizations on the one hand and learning about 
Internet technology on the other allowed the existing structures within the women’s movement 
to develop better facilities for using cyber-technology, in order to promote easier and broader 
theories about feminism. Cyberspace emerged as a useful and strategic space for activist-
journalists, young people and critics of hierarchical power. 
                                                     
15 Wilding, Faith (1998) History of Cyberfeminism, https://historyofcyberfeminism.wordpress.com/history-of-
cyberfeminism/: accessed 25 April 2016; Wilding, Faith (1998) Where is the feminism in Cyberfeminism?  
http://www.obn.org/cfundef/faith_def.html: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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At the beginning of the year 2000, a news website under the name Zanan-e-Iran (Iran’s 
Women) was set up. The editorial for this website was written by one of the women close to the 
country’s reformists. The website was dedicated to news and reports about women, and it was 
active only for a short period. In fact, the importance of forming civil organizations and groups 
to help support a presence within the cyber-world is very important. Websites that begin their 
activities with an individual contributor don’t normally last long or find a wide audience. 
Examining the manner in which these sites evolved in Iran and those managed outside the 
country, one can see that there is a continuity between the first generation of feminists at the 
beginning of the constitutional era and those active during the period marked by the 
nationalization of the oil industry. These women’s association had similar styles in media 
production – presenting themselves as an institution and publishing a magazine or website 
leading to the phenomenon of feminist activist-journalist. 
 
In 2002, Iran’s first feminist website, Tribune Feministi (The Feminist Tribune),16 became 
connected to the Women’s Cultural Centre. This website was managed by the members of the 
women’s centre as the main conduit of secular feminism in the country. Although this was 
supposedly the reformist era in Iran, the ‘Feminist Tribune’ was suppressed four times in just 
two years of activities. Finally, after multiple meetings with the members of the cultural centre to 
find a solution to the issue of suppression, it was decided that they should use a different title. 
Removing the word ‘feminist’ would make it less likely to be identified and therefore suppressed. 
The new website therefore adopted the title Zanestan (Her Land).17 
  
In fact, even the process of choosing a name for a feminist website proved to be as 
complicated as designing a defence tactic in a long-term war of attrition with a government 
targeting women’s publications and any other type of involvement with women’s issues. After 
the launch of ‘Her Land’ by the women’s cultural centre, other groups of independent women 
and NGOs began to launch their own sites. Most prominent were Meydan e Zanan (Women’s 
Field)18 and Kanoon e Zanan Iran (Iranian Women’s Club).19 One of the most prominent websites 
acting as a catalyst for change in 2005, at the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s regime, was Taghiir 
Baraye Barabary (Change for Equality).20 
 
The website Madreseh e Feministi (Feminist School) 21and Ta qanoone khanevade barabar 
(Toward Fair Family Law), which later changed its named to ‘The Feminism’ (Bidarzani),22 were 
established after the ‘Change for Equality’ website. In 2016, they are still active promoting 
feminism in Iran. ‘The Feminist School’ is a good example of cyber-feminism in Iran promoting 
diversity, decentralizing from power and opposing hierarchical power relationships in cyber-
feminism. Its membership has presented the theory of self-reliant cells, which is based on 
establishing several small cyber-groups that work independently yet in the framework of 
women’s-movement goals. 
 
                                                     
16 www.iftribune.es/WCC.htm: accessed 25 April 2016. 
17 www.zanestan.es/sitemap.html , accessed 25 April 2016. 
18 www.Meydaan.info: accessed 25 April 2016. 
19 www.ir-women.com: accessed 25 April 2016. 
20 www.we-change.org: accessed 25April 2016. 
21 www.Feministschool.com : accessed 25April 2016. 
22 http://bidarzani.com/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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Amongst Iranian websites outside of Iran are ‘Shahrzad News’;23 Shabakeh Hambastegi 
Zanan (‘Iranian Women’s Solidarity’);24 and, in recent years, Ma Zanan (‘We, Women’)25 and 
Khaneh Amn (‘The Women’s Shelter’).26 Two other websites, called Polhaii Baray Zanan (Bridges 
for Women)27and ‘Zan Negar’,28 have been formed in the last two years – mostly dedicated to 
translating articles and reports from non-Persian writers. Since 2014, there have also been two 
websites with the names ‘Macho-land’29 and Shish Rangs (‘Six Colours’),30 which cover 
homosexual and women’s issues together. Unlike the variety of websites inside Iran, their 
members and directors are avowedly secular and, mostly, radical feminists. 
 
The My Stealthy Freedom31 campaign on Facebook has been one of the best-known acts 
amongst Iranian-diaspora feminists in recent years, as an interactive and popular form of mass-
media launching cyber campaigns for civil activists.  
 
4. CASE STUDIES OF CYBERFEMINISM IN AND OUTSIDE IRAN 
 
The modern nature of the cyber-world bypasses print media’s traditional structures. In Marshall 
Berman’s appropriation of Marx’s and Engels’s famous dictum: ‘All that is solid melts into air’.  
  
The impact of cyber-technology inside and outside Iran can be illustrated by the following two 
case studies. The ‘Feminist School’ website was launched with the effort of groups of activist-
feminists in Iran. And the My Stealthy Freedom campaign was started by the efforts of one 
Iranian feminist journalist outside the country, in 2014–16 on Facebook. 
 
 
4.1. The Feminist School 
 
In 2008, the website ‘The Feminist School’ declared itself as an entity, formed by a small group 
of activist-journalists. This group was at first made up of members, founders and activists 
involved in a ‘one million signatures campaign’,32 which claimed to change discriminatory laws 
and sought to secure equal rights in family law and an end to polygamy, honour killings and any 
other forms of violence against women. 
 
Its website, ‘Change For Equality’, was an online representation of the ‘One Million 
Signatures’ campaign. The Feminist School group declared their separate existence from the 
campaign whilst still emphasizing their commitment to its original goals. They also developed a 
                                                     
23 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCNXaN_mtNNqM8FDKJSD3jZw: accessed 25 April 2016. 
24 www.iran-women-solidarity.net: accessed 25April 2016. 
25 http://mazanan.com/?p=3808: accessed 25April 2016. 
26 http://www.khanehamn.org/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
27 http://www.bridgesforwomen.org/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
28 http://zannegaar.net/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
29 http://macholand.org/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
30 https://6rang.wordpress.com/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
31 https://www.facebook.com/StealthyFreedom: accessed 25 April 2016. 
32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Million_Signatures: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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theory of organizing into a Self-Reliant Cell, as ‘an explosion of centralized activity branching out 
to many separate but contiguous organizations, societies and movements’.33  
 
An emphasis on the importance of pluralism and also the necessity of increasing the 
quantity of women’s media were the fundamental reasons for practising this theory. Additionally, 
the group saw the contradictions and criticisms between the centralized structures of the 
campaign and their own desired goal, such as a networking structure. The centralized 
organization determined the manner in which they were running the ‘Change for Equality’ 
website. This caused organizational problems with regard to circulation of information and the 
publishing of articles. The idea of self/reliant cells as Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani proposed – 
‘an effort to break the barriers of campaign structure’ (Ahmadi Khorasani, 2012: 238–9) – aimed 
to break down the centralized organizational structure, and to shape a networked movement. 
 
Although chosen, after much discussion, from critical observations within the Feminist 
School, the theory of self/reliant cells eventually facilitated a better use of Internet technology – 
one that gradually made a decentralized modern outlook and organizational method inevitable. 
 
For the Feminist School, the nature of cyberspace as a borderless geography was a 
welcome solution that could transform the centralized ‘campaign for one million signatures’ into 
a decentralized one. 
 
The One Million Signature campaign was originally a leaderless movement built on face-
to-face relationships with different spectrums, classes and groups of women in different cities. 
The bottom-up approach and the horizontal structure of relationships forming part of the 
campaign were highly effective in terms of changing discriminatory laws, but became hampered 
by the problem of centralization. The centralization of the campaign limited decision making 
about information and news distribution. Such decisions were confined to Tehran, and made by 
a few members. This type of relationship was paradoxical, as the campaign in theory valued a 
horizontal structure between members and a pluralist working model. 
 
Against a background of increasing security pressures and limited internet access, the 
authorities started to target well-known administrators of the website. These people were 
interrogated and threatened, so the campaign website began to publish the news about the arrest 
of its members. The author of this paper was one of those arrested and while the news of her 
arrest was not made public on the Campaign’s website, it was nevertheless reported by others. 
This was a conscious choice in order to collect more facts and document the government’s 
actions which could then be used in a more strategic way by international human rights 
organizations, particularly Reports Without Borders. 
 
Launching a parallel website run by different people, and not under the authority of the 
campaign website, was a defensive strategy to help to relieve pressure on well-known members 
and to continue the spread of the campaign’s dialogue. The Feminist School undertook this as an 
innovative move, prompted by very difficult conditions, with full knowledge of the theoretical 
approach (i.e. that of Self-Reliant cells) and security concerns surrounding it. 
 
This transformative move, like most innovations, was initially shocking to some 
members of the campaign – especially the website administrators, who were critical of the 
                                                     
33 Loghmani ,Sara (2008) Self reliant cells an Idea based on One million Signature campaign, 
http://www.feministschool.com/spip.php?article51: accessed 24 April 2016. 
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Feminist School. There were accusations of splitting from the campaign’s main website, which 
led to an unfriendly and hostile environment amongst campaign members. 
 
Eventually this problem lessened, when other members of the campaign in Tehran and 
other cities also launched their own websites. The unfriendly relations levelled out to a more 
professional working relationship. Even so, the new tactics of the Feminist School were 
scrutinized and condemned by campaign website members with written attacks. Despite all these 
challenges, the Feminist School did publish and promote dialogue in the women’s movement 
and produced a discourse in support of different groups in and outside of campaign. 
 
The presence of the ‘Feminist School’ – and, later, other websites – presented a 
transparent critique of power relations within the campaign. Some members were not able to 
launch independent websites as they lacked knowledge about how to use cyberspace, and some 
were not motivated to take advantage of non-centralized Internet spaces. Some were not able to 
participate in all aspects that modern Internet technology offered to a horizontal structure. 
 
Overall, the campaign could not take these innovations on board, and this led to a lack of 
cohesion in its structure – an apparent example of the concept ‘all that is solid melts into air’ 
(Berman, Marshall [after Marx and Engels], 1985). Furthermore, at the same time it also had to 
deal with suppression and persecution by the security forces. 
 
One of the successful moves by the Feminist School was the formation of two pluralist 
coalitions involving different groups in cyberspace and in real space. The School set up coalitions 
of small groups within and outside the campaign in order to advocate for gender equality, 
demanding open dialogue and equal laws. The first, named Family Law Coalition,34 opposed a 
new article to the polygamy law that threatened to make women’s situations harder than before. 
The Iranian ‘Family Protection Bill’ added two articles to this law so that men could take 
multiple wives. But the coalition’s efforts were successful, and the Iranian parliament (known in 
Iran as the Majlis) removed those two contested articles, indefinitely postponing the bill’s 
discussion on the floor of parliament. In addition, the Majlis sent the bill back to the 
Parliamentary Judicial Committee for further revisions. 
 
The coalition were successful in suspending the article. The publication of new articles 
and reports on the ‘Feminist School’ website created the possibility for active members outside 
Tehran to contribute, and enabled a strong networked organization. The successful experience of 
the Family Law Coalition encouraged the Feminist School to establish other coalitions too. Just 
before the presidential election in 2009, the Hamgraii e Zanan Baraye Motalebat (‘Coalition of 
Iranian women states its election demands’) was formed.35 
 
Their goal was twofold: to make Iran a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and to aim for the elimination of 
discriminatory laws against women, especially through the review of articles 19, 20, 21 and 115 
of the constitution. 
 
This coalition had a different focus from the One Million Signatures campaign, which 
centred on the legal discourse. The former focused on the democratic discourse as a turning 
point for the women’s movement at that time. 
 
                                                     
34 Amani, Elahe (2008) Iran women say no to polygamy, 
http://www.alternet.org/story/100941/iran_women_say_no_to_polygamy: accessed 25 April 2016. 
35 http://www.payvand.com/news/09/may/1236.html: accessed 25April 2016. 
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The electoral slogan of the coalition was ‘We vote for women’s demands’. The coalition 
aimed to reach governmental and public audiences. At the public level, they took advantage of 
the relatively open space available during election periods to go on to the streets and speak with 
different women, encouraging them to vote for those candidates who supported women’s 
demands. At the governmental level, some members went to speak to the four presidential 
candidates and their spokespeople about the demands of the coalition, an approach also utilized 
in the One Million Signatures campaign. 
 
The ‘Feminist School’ website had earlier started publishing theories and ideas about 
democracy and political participation amongst the members of the women’s movement. In 
cyberspace, they supported the real-world discussions and activities of the coalition through 
publishing theoretical materials and the transmission of news/reports. 
 
After the fraudulent 2009 election, the announcement of the real voting tallies led to a 
wave of suppression, arrests and killings. Many independent women’s groups were affected, and 
there was severe repression by the state. Despite cyber-attacks by the government, some 
women’s websites, such as ‘Feminist School’, were able to publish news of the suppression. 
However, the cost of this effort was too great. For instance, on 27 December 2009, the current 
author wrote a testimonial called ‘Green Barricades in the Red Ashura’,36 relating to a street 
demonstration that had been forcefully attacked by police and the security forces. She published 
her report on ‘Feminist School’, and, eight hours later, police attacked her home and arrested 
her. It was her third period of imprisonment due to her writing and political activities. 
Throughout all these repressive efforts, the Internet remained the only tool for promoting non-
violence and the discussions and activities of the women’s movement. 
 
The governmental censoring and suppression targeted well-known websites. Many of the 
administrators of these sites were imprisoned or were forced to flee the country – for instance, 
the ‘Feminist School’ was suppressed 14 times in 2009 alone.37 Young members of this website 
had to leave the country, and one of its administrators was imprisoned. These difficult 
circumstances did not stop the resistance of small self/reliant cells in the cyber-world. The 
difficult conditions that caused the destruction of independent organizations in the real world 
did not stop cyber activities through the establishment of new independent groups that were 
formed according to the theory of self/reliant cells. 
 
Cyber-feminism in Iran was, however, occasionally forced into hiding when there was an 
increase in suppression – although, with its technological facilities, it did prove to be a 
progressive tool for the support of feminist aims and discourse. At the end of 2010 until the 
beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 and on to 2013, the Feminist School shifted to publishing 
very mild feminist literature, i.e. sociological theories and the issue of domestic violence against 
women, in order to avoid government attacks against them. 
 
The new presidency in 2013 led to a better condition for feminist views to be heard. As 
the country’s most popular social network, Facebook was a space used by the vast majority of 
the public in Iran. The Feminist School decided to set up a Facebook page linked to their 
website. This increased the School’s activities and the quality of articles. Members of the 
                                                     
36 http://feministschool.com/english/spip.php?article360: accessed 2 August 2016. 
37 https://hra-news.org/fa/cultural/1389-02-03-13-25-18: accessed 25 April 2016;  
https://rahekargar.wordpress.com/2010/04/22/dena-902/: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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Facebook page of the Feminist School reached 70,000. This number of members for a page, 
specifically for feminists that were trying not call attention to themselves, was significant in both 
sections (Persian and non-Persian language). 
 
The quality of the Feminist School’s topics and material attracted articles from non-
Iranian feminists, including members of the School who had been forced to leave the country 
after the suppression following the 2009 election but had kept their co-working relationship with 
the website. The site’s editor, Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, one of the most well-known activist-
journalist and a researcher of feminism in Iran, has continued to live in the country, braving the 
dangers that she has always been under. Despite these dangers, she has kept the website and her 
relationship with exiled members of the School. In fact, ‘Feminist School’ is a bridge that 
connects the discourse of feminists living in the country with the external diaspora. 
 
The Feminist School are a successful example of Iranian cyber-feminism due to several 
factors. They were able to harness cyber-technology to promote the aims of the women’s 
movement. They took on a modern, horizontal form of leadership, which facilitated a broad 
spread of knowledge and shared information. Working within a decentralized network, they were 
able to mobilize both real-world and cyberspace resources, combining on-the-ground fieldwork 
with cyber activities at various times as the need arose. They were also able to build on the 
significant social capital of the School’s founders, and to build bridges, via these members, 
between Iranian feminists in and outside Iran – and also non-Iranian feminists. In doing so, they 
created strong, internal and external feminist campaigns. They were careful to enjoy, and to be 
uniquely Iranian, while also utilizing the experience of other progressive countries by taking an 
educational approach to learn from them. Their activities were carried out voluntarily, and they 
were able to encourage the participation of successful writers on the website, ensuring quality 
and relevance. 
 
 
4.2. The Presence of Diaspora Feminism in Cyberspace 
 
After the crackdown of 2009, as indicated above, many well-known Iranian activist women, 
along with other political and civil activists, were forced into exile. This was the third wave of 
exiles in the last 60 years in Iran. What differentiated this from the earlier waves was the 
presence of middle-aged feminist women who were well-known representatives of the women’s 
movement. This group had particular difficulties in going into exile. All but one were married, 
and had to leave adult children and husbands behind. Though some were able to bring their 
family to join them, the breakup of other families has created a host of mental, social and 
emotional traumas for them. As they were part of an elite group, and part of the intellectual life 
of Iranian society, their new situation in exile was not easy. It was difficult at that age to find the 
motivation and ability to retrain or re-educate themselves. Many did not have the sufficient level 
of language proficiency in their host country, and it proved difficult to learn a new language at 
their age as well as cope with mental/emotional anxiety. 
 
The situation for young women was significantly better than their middle-aged 
counterparts. These young women had the ability to use the Internet, learn new languages and 
engage in journalistic activities, and quickly found themselves courted by the media outside Iran. 
Some received help from human-rights organizations with scholarships and possibilities to enter 
universities. 
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Nevertheless, these young women like their older compatriots shared a feeling of shame 
because of friends left behind who were imprisoned or under prosecution, banned from working 
or studying. They felt guilty at having left the activist life back in Iran, and were torn between 
staying or going back. This uncertainty was a barrier preventing them from making a new life in 
their host country, specifically given their mental and psychological anxieties due to previous 
campaign struggles and imprisonment. 
 
Members of both age groups sought to maintain relationships, and the cyber-world 
became a refuge for these members of the diaspora movement. They took shelter in cyberspace 
– not only to publish and spread the word, or to build feminist networks, but also to retain 
political and social communications and to heal. Cyberspace provided the possibility for 
personal, emotional networks, and the creation of an honest, interactive and unofficial space 
through Facebook kept companions connected and created a welcoming space for the diaspora 
feminists. Facebook as a technology enabled windows of opportunity for diaspora feminists to 
stay linked to the motherland and their native tongue. 
 
Considering Facebook as a continent on its own, young women activists grew up in this 
borderless geography even as the government in Iran was putting pressure on Facebook users 
inside the country with threats of imprisonment, suppression, etc. Facebook was providing a 
borderless space in which to publish articles by groups such as the Feminist School. The 
resulting exchange of views allowed for easy discussion, and broke the isolation of political and 
social groups. It encouraged members to use Facebook in a serious manner, and laid the 
foundations for campaigns and cyber-coalitions on specific problems facing women in Iran, 
ranging from political to social, legal and citizenship issues. 
 
In 2012 came their first Facebook campaign: ‘No to obligatory Hijab’.38 The campaign 
was launched by a group of student-movement members who had left Iran in 2009–10. 
Although they kept their identity as the members of the student movement, they worked closely 
on several human-rights topics during their time in exile – a period officially regarded as a time 
of failure for the student movement in Iran. 
 
Most of the women activists of this third wave of exiles, and those remaining in Iran, 
supported this campaign, though it was not backed by feminist women of the second wave of 
political migrants from Iran. This disagreement was due to the liberal approach of the 
campaign’s founders, which was not accepted by second-wave migrants.39  
 
The next campaign happened in 2013, just before the presidential election. Two days 
prior to election day, a young female activist who had left the country in 2009 started a 
campaign, ‘I vote without Hijab’.40 Those who followed this campaign believed that participation 
in elections was necessary to achieve women’s rights, and were mostly the third wave of exiles. 
The feminists of the second wave, those who had a more radical approach to elections, did not 
join this campaign as they did not believe in voting for the government. So in the author’s view, 
even if they did not believe in the compulsory hijab, they prevented the chance for a unified 
feminist discourse, which could have reached out to not only the elite feminists in exile but also 
to ordinary Iranian women everywhere. 
                                                     
38https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=%DA%A9%D9%85%D9%BE%DB%8C%D9%86%20%D9%86%
D9%87%20%D8%A8%D9%87%20%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%20%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8
%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C: accessed 19 April 2016. 
39 http://bamdadkhabar.com/2012/08/11612/: accessed 19 April 2016. 
40 http://www.radiozamaneh.com/76664: accessed 25 April 2016. 
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This second generation of feminists had lived in European countries for a long time, 
enjoyed a stable social and economic structure and had their own professional network. In not 
supporting this campaign about the compulsory hijab, they missed an important opportunity. 
Particularly because it invited Iranian women living outside Iran to choose not to wear the hijab 
when voting in embassies, ‘I vote without Hijab’ was a strategic way of promoting discourse on 
the right of all Iranian women to choose what they wear. But unfortunately, due to the lack of 
awareness of the second wave of feminists, the chance to link to ordinary Iranian woman outside 
the country was lost. 
 
The campaign ‘I vote with no Hijab’ lasted only three days, but it had a quite profound 
impact in keeping alive discourse on the compulsory hijab. It created the groundwork for the 
‘My Stealthy Freedom’ campaign. 
 
 
4.3. The ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ Campaign 
 
This second case study covers the ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ campaign, which has its own specific 
history. 
 
The establishment of the moderate new government in 2013 created a window of hope 
for Iranian feminists. This sense of hope could be seen in the growth of new social networks via 
Facebook. In 2013, under the new president, Hassan Rouhani, who represented the moderate 
political wing in Iran, a more moderate and mild climate emerged. Masih Alinejad, a well-known 
journalist who lived in the United States took advantage of this moment and planted the seed of 
her campaign, ‘My Stealthy Freedom’. She had left the country in 2009 and knew a lot about 
Iran. She set up the Facebook page in order to encourage women to protest against the 
compulsory hijab, and to object to all restrictions that Iranian women face in their native 
country. 
 
Due to discriminatory laws, Iranian women have to wear the hijab in public places. Their 
personal choice is disregarded. The obligation even applies to women belonging to different 
religions, as all are obliged to wear the Islamic hijab. More than 30 years after the revolution, the 
enforcement of the compulsory hijab is still one of the unsolved oppressions of women by the 
regime. Even those who fail to satisfy political Islam by not conforming to the type of their scarf 
or the colour of their clothes can be imprisoned, fined or sentenced to receive corporal 
punishment (lashes). 
 
Masih Alinejad states the following on her Facebook page ‘My Stealthy Freedom’: 
 
This page does not belong to any group or party. This page is concerned with women 
inside Iran. All women and girls in Iran are submitted to social restrictions and deterrent 
laws and they are not free to choose what to wear. But considering all these limitations, 
sometimes they experience some freedoms. Those free moments from these restrictions 
this page records until the day that women gain the right to choose their clothes. The 
stealthy freedom of women will occur on this page. 
 
She has, from the beginning, told activist women not to consider her and her campaign 
in a serious way. The idea of launching this campaign ‘came to my mind when I accidentally 
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published one of my photos when I was driving without a scarf’.41 On her personal Facebook 
page, she asked others to send similar photos if they had any. And it seems that lots of women 
and girls have taken photos of themselves in public areas. And she simply wrote a story about 
that. 
 
Two weeks after that story and the pictures were published on Facebook, more than 
230,000 people had joined the page. By the end of 2015, more than 750,000 had joined. The 
page attracted feminist and non-feminist women alike, inside and outside the country. Even the 
second wave of feminists in exile took notice. 
 
There are several reasons the campaign could attract so many people. Firstly, Masih 
Alinejad was an independent journalist who, though well-known as a reformist feminist 
journalist, has never been affiliated with the women’s movement in Iran. She was therefore not 
part of a particular faction or political affiliation within the women’s movement. Secondly, she 
touched on a commonly shared discourse about the oppressive use of the compulsory hijab for 
all classes of Iranian women. Thirdly, the page cleverly showed individual objection in daily life, 
which had no particular political or social aim. This stealthy objection against the compulsory 
hijab gave voice to women from whom feminists had never heard before. These women had 
never been affiliated with the women’s movement and had not paid attention to the right to 
choose one’s own clothes. 
 
At the beginning of the campaign, in a round-table discussion on BBC Persian TV, I 
asked Masih Alinejad about the potential of this campaign to move into activism (see the 
transcript in the Appendix, below). She replied that ‘this campaign is a journalistic movement in 
cyber-feminism which is run by women who have become their own media subject. If this 
campaign is to be connected with the women’s movement then women’s movement members 
should follow up.’42 
 
Masih Alinejad, as the administrator of the ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ Facebook page, was relying on 
35 years of the women’s struggle. She was using her popularity and her ease of presence on 
Facebook to bring the demands of women to the media. Although this Facebook campaign 
opened up public debate about the hijab, the question is whether the nearly one million members 
of this page43 would actually make a difference in Iran and change the government prohibition 
on women choosing their own clothes? There is no clear answer to that. 
 
The importance of this page for cyberfeminism leads to a series of questions: 
 
1. Would the negative and aggressive reactions from the government media against its 
administrator motivate members of the ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ page to be more active 
towards changing the law? 
2. Do any of the members of this page want to become actively involved in changing the 
law? 
3. Does this cyber-page have the same goals as feminist activists, or is it just a 
controversial form of digital activism-as-‘clicktivism’?44 
                                                     
41 Masih Alinejad, personal correspondence with the author. 
42 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRAehcI-L58&feature=youtu.be (starting at app. 6 mins into the 
recording): accessed 25April 2016. 
43 983,697 members, as of April 2016; see http://mystealthyfreedom.net/en/: accessed 12 May 2016. 
44 ‘Clicktivism’, a cyber-behaviour whereby people can support a cause at the click of a computer mouse, comes as 
membership of traditional campaigning organizations, such as political parties and trade unions, is at an all-time low. 
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4. Do such movements in the cyber-world have the capability to utilize social movements 
in the real world? 
5. Can social media and communication technologies that enable the popularity of such 
sporadic activities shape new trends within the women’s movement? 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION: DOES CLICKTIVISM REPRESENT A DANGER OR A HELPING 
HAND FOR CYBER FEMINISM? 
 
In a world that has become a network with the wireless Internet and the specific 
characteristics of that is the distribution of photos and ideas like a virus, movements can 
develop contagiously. This movement in the south and north, in Tunisia and Iceland 
began and from there sent its own fire to the variety of social perspectives in the four 
corners of this blue planet which was in danger of destruction as a result of the greed of 
human beings.45 
 
The Arab Spring in 2011 showed the world a different face of the Middle East and Arabic 
countries with their continuous presence in cyberspace. Sociologists and experts in social 
movements became alert to the impact of Internet technology and its importance for social 
movements. 
 
Social movements are, characteristically, collaborative, non-hierarchal, horizontal 
networks. However, cyber- and Internet networks, although able to be harnessed as effective 
mobilizing tools in the Arab Spring, did not on their own produce the social uprisings.  
 
In Iran, there is no freedom to form political parties, trade unions or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Social movements have been the ones with the capability to mobilize the 
masses to discuss their political and civil demands. Access to the Internet by social movements 
has enabled them to reach out to audiences within Iranian society. On the other hand, it can also 
decrease political action as people can feel that just signing a petition on the Internet or ‘liking’ a 
piece of breaking news, a report or an article is, in itself, a political act. Such activity may go no 
further, and people do not take up their responsibility in political and civil fields. This 
phenomenon has been recognized as the reappearance of ‘slacktivism’ (so-called slacker 
behavior, dating from the pre-Internet age) through the cyber arena. We can say that 
slacktivism’s online equivalent is ‘clictivism’, which is defined as feel-good online activism with 
less, or even zero, political or social impact than real-life mobilization. People simply click, ‘like’ 
or sign online petitions, writing some comments and do nothing more. 
 
Its historical, social and political background shows that the Feminist School was formed 
out of years of Iranian women’s-movement activities, built on years of effort by members in 
both real and cyber-worlds. Its web page uses many different tactics in different situations; it is 
not part of phenomena such as slacktivism or clicktivism in the cyber-world. 
 
                                                     
See Howard, Emma (2014) How ‘clicktivism’ has changed the face of political campaigns, 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/24/clicktivism-changed-political-campaigns-38-degrees-change: 
accessed 25 April 2016. 
45 Manuel Castells (2012) Networks of Outrage and Hope, Social Movements in the Internet Age, translated by Mojtaba 
Gholipoor. Tehran: Markaz, p. 29. 
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In the case of the ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ campaign, its administrator was honestly just 
looking to utilize social networks and promote the discourse of the right to choose clothes. 
There was no intention to link this social-media campaign to political agitation in Iran in order to 
change the law. Even if the campaign reveals the desperation of the women, it belongs to the 
many kinds of individualized expressions that remain in cyberspace. 
 
Asef Bayat calls these types of expressions non-movements: 
 
The vehicles through which ordinary people change their societies are not simply audible 
mass protests or revolutions, even though they represent an aspect of popular 
mobilization; rather, people resort more widely to what I will elaborate as 
“nonmovements”— the collective endeavors of millions of noncollective actors, carried 
out in the main squares, back streets, court houses, or communities.46 
 
The point is that if these non-movements gather enough support from the independent 
media – especially in cyberspace and, in the case of the ‘Stealthy’ campaign, the support of the 
women’s movement – then they have the opportunity to become an effective social movement. 
 
Masih Alinejad comments that even if she does not ‘see this willpower and capability to 
organize’ and is concerned at the level of ‘suppression, oppression and pressure of the 
government’, she would have a ‘positive outlook’ if women’s movements organized a 
demonstration against the hijab.47 
 
She sees two main factors: the freedom of holding demonstrations and the need for 
sufficent social capital. But she does not consider the demands and willpower of the nearly one 
million members of the campaign. Could these members contemplate bearing the heavy cost of 
security agents curtailing their civil activities if they objected in real life to what they objected to 
in cyberspace? Can the cyber-experience provide the strength for people to join struggles in the 
real world? 
 
The reality is that the women’s movement cannot be limited to either cyberspace or real 
space. Both spaces are needed. The Iranian women’s movement is now trying to understand how 
to be active in both arenas, harnessing the important effect of social networks and ensuring that 
cyber-feminism does not just melt away into clicktivism. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
46 Asef Bayat (2010) Life as politics: How Ordinary people change the Middle East, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, p. ix. 
47 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRAehcI-L58&feature=youtu.be (starting at app. 6 mins into the 
recording): accessed 25April 2016. 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW WITH MASIH ALINEJAD, DIRECTOR OF THE ‘MY 
STEALTHY FREEDOM’ CYBER CAMPAIGN 
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRAehcI-L58&feature=youtu.be: accessed 
25April 2016 (starting app. 6 mins into the recording). 
 
1. Please briefly explain about the ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ campaign, and your motivation when you 
launched this campaign? 
 
‘My Stealthy Freedom’ is an online campaign which stands against the repressive laws 
enforced against women in Iran. The compulsory hijab is the most visible symbol of 
oppression against women, and now women across Iran share pictures of themselves 
without headscarves on MSF.  
 
MSF is a platform on Facebook where Women in Iran have been posting pictures of 
themselves after taking their hijab off in public, in a country where it is illegal for a 
female to leave the house without wearing a headscarf under Islamic law. The page is 
showcasing women who are going one step further in their acts of dissent by uploading 
videos of themselves walking through populated areas with their heads uncovered. 
 
‘My Stealthy Freedom’ flourished into a movement attracting nearly one million 
supporters. Before being a campaigner, I have to say I am a journalist. For me it is really 
important to give voice to voiceless people – specially the women of Iran. 
 
Let me be clear, there are two Irans: one is ‘on the map’ – where you see women in hijab. 
The other is illegal Iran – where women sing, dance, take off their scarves. Everything 
they are banned from [doing] they do underground. I determined to strengthen ‘illegal’ 
Iran and portray the country’s ‘real identity’ through social media. Before the MSF 
campaign, I used social media to give voice to those mothers who lost their beloved ones 
on the 2009 [post-presidential-election] demonstrations, and now I use social media to 
give ordinary women a voice. ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ is a mirror to look in and see that 
those women who protest against the forced hijab are not isolated in doing this, it allows 
them to talk to others who support them and want to end this discrimination. The 
woman who sent their photos and videos to me are only some examples of a silent 
majority. They are the representatives of those who don’t agree with the rules, who dare 
to risk their lives and reject the mandatory-hijab law in Iran. Stealthy freedom does not 
scare the government of Iran at all, but when you talk about your stealthy freedom a lot, 
that does scare them. They don’t want us, the women of Iran, to be heard. 
 
Every day in Iran there is a cultural war between the Iranian Government and the 
women of Iran. There are two different lifestyles – one for those who want to be 
themselves, who want to be free to choose what they want to wear, who want to dance, 
who want to listen to music, who want to watch volleyball and football in stadiums, and 
those who want to control this society and its women. You never hear the voice of these 
women in any official media. MSF allows Iranian women who have never had a voice or 
a chance to speak to form their own media. 
 
On Iranian TV, it’s all women in black, but on the MSF page on Facebook, its women 
without headscarves and wearing colourful clothing, dancing and singing. 
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This is [also] the cultural war between the Iranian Government and young people. Again, 
MSF picked the hijab as its main issue because the hijab is the most visible symbol of 
oppression against the women of Iran. 
 
2. When did this campaign declare itself? What is your estimation for the length of activities? 
In May 2014, the page began when I posted a photograph of myself driving down a road 
in Iran without wearing a headscarf. The image was captioned with: ‘The Hijab is being 
forced on women not only by the Morality Police, but also out of consideration for 
family, through wanting to keep a job and because of fear of judgment from others.’ 
I wrote that I had experienced all of these pressures too: ‘I was sure that most Iranian 
women who don’t believe in the forced hijab have enjoyed freedom in secret, so I asked 
them if they wished to share this moment of stealthy freedom.’ 
 
The word stealthy is a translation of yavashaki, which means ‘hidden’. And this means a 
lot for a woman who grew up in Iran. If you fell in love with someone: yavashaki. You 
travel with your boyfriend: yavashaki. You take off your scarf: yavashaki. Alcohol is 
yavashaki. Dating is yavashaki. Dancing is yavashaki. Music is yavashaki. Singing solo for 
women is yavashaki. Everything you can imagine that’s normal to you and me exists in 
Iran but you have to hide it, as if it doesn’t exist: yavashaki. Why? Because it’s a crime, 
and according to Iranian Sharia laws, you get lashes for some of these so-called ‘crimes’. 
 
So when I asked women through my Facebook page if they do have yavashaki, the 
response I received shortly after starting the page was staggering: I was bombarded by 
pictures. Then I thought these women need their own platform. They don't want to be 
yavashaki ANY MORE. They want to speak out against the compulsory hijab. That was 
the reason that I started to publish their photos on a new page called ‘My Stealthy 
Freedom’. 
 
In the photos, which I published without including full names, women in different 
outdoor environments can be seen after removing their hijab, alongside a few words 
describing the lack of freedom embodied in having to wear a hijab, or what it means to 
briefly remove it in public. 
 
3. Was this campaign the first cyber-movement to target the wearing of the obligatory hijab in Iran? 
 
Of course MSF was not the first cyber-movement to target the wearing of the obligatory 
hijab in Iran. 
 
4. Have you got any criticism of any other previous cyber-movements related to the hijab? 
No I do not. They encouraged us. 
 
5. How did other campaigns and movements before yours influence your motivation when you launched this 
campaign? Have you benefited from any of the experiences encountered by similar movements? 
I think all the previous movements against the mandatory hijab helped me to get a better 
view of how to run MSF campaign. I realized that in this time I have to give the platform 
to the ordinary women rather than women activists or female journalists and so on. […] 
It’s a place where ordinary female Iranians with different opinions can meet and talk 
about how they feel, think and what they do in private. They don’t have to be afraid of 
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censorship, like in the Iranian public sphere. It makes them brave to see that they are not 
alone with their thoughts and actions. 
 
With social media, Iranian women inside Iran can break open the barrier between private 
and public life. For instance, one post showed a mother with her daughter. ‘The beautiful 
seaside in Kish [Island]’, the younger woman wrote, ‘We strolled on the rocks and 
experienced the cool breeze flowing through our hair. Is this a big request?’ A young 
woman from the city of Fuman, in the northern province of Gilan, sent a picture of 
herself in the woods. ‘I took this picture in the spring’, she wrote, ‘It makes me feel 
happy.’ Another young woman was pictured unveiled just next to a big billboard in 
Tehran’s Yas sports complex asking women to respect the Islamic hijab. The captions 
are sometimes more powerful than the images of bare heads and smiling faces. One 
woman wrote, ‘I just want to have the right to CHOOSE! Maybe I would have even 
chosen to wear a scarf if I’d had options to choose from. But it hurts me so much when 
others make decisions for ME instead of myself.’ 
 
In many of the images, the women fly the veil behind them like a defiant flag.  
 
So what is the significance of this coming together on this page? The reason is exactly to 
show that our sharing of freedom in Iran is STEALTHY. 
 
These stealthy acts will challenge the absence of freedom, when revealed. Another 
significance of MSF: this page does not belong to any political group and the initiative 
reflects the concerns of Iranian women, who face legal and social restrictions. All of the 
photos and captions posted have been sent by women from all over Iran, and this is a 
site dedicated to Iranian women inside the country who want to share their ‘stealthily’ 
taken photos without the veil. I also learned from experiences that we have to translate 
all the posts into English and French to get more international media involved, and also 
requesting the attention of every single one of those female politicians travelling to Iran. 
Because they have to wear the hijab as well during their visit in Iran. 
 
When the officials of our country travel to non-Muslim countries, they want them to 
respect their Islamic values. They conveniently avoid attending the receptions that you 
organize on the pretext that alcohol is being served. If that is the case, why don’t the 
Western female politicians ask them to respect our human values, which is the freedom 
to choose? For more than 30 years, our questions have been censored in Iran’s national 
media outlets. For more than 30 years, it has been forbidden even for journalists and 
reporters to broach questions with regards to the hijab. 
 
However, many women in Iran want their voices to be heard by the government officials 
of their own country. These are women who should be entitled to the freedom of choice 
when it comes to deciding what to wear, and they do not want this right to remain 
stealthy for the rest of their lives. 
 
We are pleading with female politicians to bring up this subject during their 
conversations with Iranian officials. 
 
We asked the female politicians around the world on MSF several times NOT TO say 
that the hijab is required by law, and that everyone should follow the law in Iran. Here 
we are talking about a discriminatory law. If we keep silent in the face of unfair laws, then 
slavery, which also used to be a law, would still be with us. 
